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INTRODUCTION 
A prosecutor is handed a complaint charging harassment and a 
harrowed woman follows him into his office.  The charges stem from 
an ex-boyfriend repeatedly making threatening calls to her over a 
recent weekend.  She saved a voicemail where her ex-boyfriend said 
he expected to see her at a funeral.  She then explains that two weeks 
earlier, he showed up at her door uninvited, called her names, and 
threatened her life before leaving when she threatened to call the 
police.  On more than a dozen other instances over the past six 
months, she says he followed her by car, called and hung up, or 
waited outside her house.  She can’t give exact dates, and adds that 
when they were dating a year earlier, her ex-boyfriend hit her but she 
never reported it. 
The prosecutor knows that the defendant is entitled to a jury trial 
on the harassment charge, reducing that charge is not an option, and 
it is a weak case.  Having spoken with defense counsel, he knows that 
the defendant is not interested in taking any plea that would involve 
an order of protection for the complainant, and that he can’t rightly 
plead the case without securing an order of protection.  The case 
needs to go to trial, and yet it will require a Herculean feat to 
convince a jury to convict a man of harassment on the sole basis of a 
few phone calls and an ambiguous voicemail. 
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In order to convict the defendant, the prosecutor will need to show 
the jury evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged conduct towards 
the complainant to explain their relationship and the hostility of the 
phone calls.  The People will be unable to prove the defendant’s 
intent to terrorize without evidence of his prior phone calls and 
conduct towards the complainant.  The complainant’s memory is 
unclear, however, and she does not provide specific details or dates 
for the defendant’s prior conduct.  The prosecutor informs the 
complainant of the prospects at trial.  He knows that the credibility, 
detail and likelihood of the prior conduct will determine whether the 
prior bad acts evidence will be admitted in his jurisdiction.1  Whether 
the prior bad acts are clear and particularized may therefore decide 
the case before it is even begun.  The prosecutor never suggests that 
the complainant do anything other than be truthful; the prosecutor 
does not even tell the complainant about the law on prior bad acts 
evidence’s admissibility, obviating any incentive for the complainant 
to tailor her testimony.  Nonetheless, the prosecutor tries to help the 
complainant remember more, probing deeper and deeper into the 
dates and circumstances of the prior events: 
When the defendant followed you, were you working at the time? 
Would you have remembered if something unusual happened on 
your regular commute? 
When the defendant struck you, did he bruise you? 
Would someone at work have noticed if you were bruised? 
Would the bruise have been covered up because it was cold outside 
(i.e., winter)?  And so on. 
While interviewing a witness, such as this hypothetical 
complainant, the prosecutor balances trying to gather information by 
probing the extent of the witness’s recollection of past events with 
trying not to influence the witness’s memory by introducing 
distortions.2  The goal is ultimately to elicit as strong a recollection as 
the witness’s memory will support so that the witness may testify 
confidently and honestly, and so that the prosecutor will be able to 
establish the necessary foundation for the evidence.  In the above 
example, the issue is elucidating the victim’s memory of uncharged 
prior bad acts by the defendant. 
 
 1. See infra notes 162–72 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 829, 851 (2002). 
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Prior bad acts evidence is any evidence or testimony regarding acts 
by the defendant that is not included in the conduct which brought 
about the criminal charges or civil claim.3  This Note examines which 
standard of proof should apply to the commission of prior bad acts for 
their admission in criminal cases.  The focus is on criminal cases 
because of the unique responsibilities of prosecutors, particularly in 
that they do not represent individual clients and instead seek 
convictions on behalf of the government. 
Such evidence is generally referred to as “prior bad acts”4 evidence, 
“uncharged misconduct”5 evidence, or evidence of a “crime, wrong, 
or other act.”6  Prior bad acts evidence is governed by Federal Rule of 
Evidence (FRE) 404(b) in federal courts, and by varying approaches 
in state courts.7  Jurisdictions have adopted different standards of 
proof for the commission of prior bad acts: some require that the 
prior bad acts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and 
convincing evidence; others, including the Supreme Court, require 
only that a hypothetical reasonable juror be able to find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the prior bad acts were 
committed by an opposing party.8  Jurisdictions that require a greater 
showing of proof tend to argue that a higher standard is necessary to 
reduce the risk of prejudice.9  In determining whether prior bad acts 
have been sufficiently proven, courts consider the detail of the 
testimony alleging the prior bad acts.10 
The purpose of this Note is to further the debate among 
jurisdictions as they decide what standard of proof to adopt for prior 
 
 3. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 4. See, e.g., Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *1 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2003). 
 5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 594, 597 (Wyo. 1993). 
 6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 7. FED R. EVID. 404(b) states: 
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character. . . .  This evidence may be admissible 
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident. 
Compare id., and LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 1104, with State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 
1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997) (rejecting the Federal Courts’ approach to prior bad act 
admissibility as laid out in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)).  For a 
discussion of the varying approaches states employ, see infra Part I.D. 
 8. See infra notes 100–44 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 167–74 and accompanying text. 
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bad acts evidence by discussing a source of prejudice to defendants 
that courts have not addressed.  Specifically, this Note argues that 
jurisdictions should consider the risk of prejudice created by witness 
preparation as they decide the appropriate standard of proof for the 
commission of prior bad acts.11  A higher standard of proof can 
incentivize more probing of a witness’s incomplete memory during 
witness interviewing and preparation, which introduces a risk of false 
testimony through memory distortions that can outweigh the risk of 
prejudice from juries hearing evidence of prior bad acts that cannot 
be proven.12  As a result, this Note argues that jurisdictions should 
adopt a minimal standard of proof to limit the risk of prejudice to the 
defendant. 
The risk of prejudice created by witness preparation through the 
genesis of false memories is certainly not limited to instances when 
prosecutors and witnesses discuss a defendant’s commission of prior 
bad acts.  Insofar as witness preparation creates such false testimony, 
it implicates, arguably, every single rule of evidence.13  This Note, 
however, focuses solely on the interplay of the prejudice of witness 
preparation and the standard of proof for prior bad acts evidence for 
two reasons.  First, the latter is an unsettled area of law and is ripe for 
analysis.  Second, this Note engages this one rule of evidence to draw 
attention to how the prejudicial risks of witness preparation may be 
included in future debates that reconsider other rules of evidence.14 
This Note is concerned with the prejudicial risks of witness 
preparation that result when a defendant is confronted by witnesses 
who have developed false memories about prior bad acts because of 
extensive witness preparation.15  Such witnesses are more difficult to 
 
 11. For a discussion of the risks of unintentionally creating false testimony 
through witness preparation, see infra Part II. 
 12. See infra notes 164–70 for a discussion of how a higher standard of proof 
implicates witness preparation, infra Part I.C.2 for a review of the prejudice created 
by prior bad acts evidence, and infra Part II for a discussion of the risks creating false 
testimony through witness preparation. 
 13. See generally Bruce A. Green, “The Whole Truth?”: How Rules of Evidence 
Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699 (1992) (discussing the 
relationship between the rules of evidence and witness preparation). 
 14. This Note does not argue that more prior bad acts evidence should or would 
be admitted because of this change.  Rather, instead of focusing on proof of 
commission, courts should continue to limit the admission of prior bad acts evidence 
by weighing its probative value against its prejudicial impact. See Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
 15. This Note assumes that in jurisdictions that require a higher standard of proof, 
attorneys are aware that detail has a corroborating effect for prior bad act allegations 
and that attorneys therefore ask their witnesses more probing questions to elicit 
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cross-examine16 and may seem more convincing to the jury—all as the 
result of a rule17 that is intended to reduce prejudice.  This Note will 
review legal scholarship and social psychology research to discuss 
how probing questions during witness interviews and preparation can 
introduce prejudice by creating false memories and memory 
distortions in the minds of witnesses.   
Part I of this Note will discuss the history and nature of the rules of 
evidence surrounding prior bad acts evidence.  Part II will discuss 
witness preparation and its risk of prejudice, particularly in the 
context of prior bad acts evidence.  Part III will argue that state courts 
that have rejected the federal courts’ approach to prior bad acts 
admissibility should instead adopt the federal approach to minimize 
the risk of prejudice to the defendant. 
I.  PRIOR BAD ACTS ADMISSIBILITY AND THE INCENTIVES IT 
CREATES 
A. Origins of the Bar Against Prior Bad Acts Evidence and Its 
Exceptions 
The bar against evidence of a defendant’s uncharged prior bad acts 
has been in existence at common law in some form since the 
seventeenth century.18  Initially, it emerged as a reaction to treason 
prosecutions in the “Star Chamber” in Great Britain.19  In 1810, the 
judges in Rex v. Cole held that “in a prosecution for an infamous 
crime, an admission by the prisoner that he had committed such an 
offence at another time and with another person, and that he had a 
tendency to such practices, ought not to be admitted.”20  Rex v. Cole 
 
specifics from their witnesses’ memories that can increase the likelihood of the 
evidence’s admissibility.  Obviously, if prosecutors’ behavior is not influenced at all 
by the rules of evidence, then changes to the rules of evidence will have no impact on 
witness preparation techniques.  For a discussion of how the rules of evidence and 
ethics affect witness preparation, see infra Part I.C.1.  And for a discussion of how the 
admissibility of prior bad acts testimony is affected by its specificity, see infra Part 
I.E. 
 16. See infra notes 246–49 and accompanying text. 
 17. The higher standard of proof of commission of prior bad acts evidence. 
 18. See Christopher M. Joseph, Other Misconduct Evidence: Rethinking Kansas 
Statutes Annotated Section 60-455, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 145, 151 (2000) (citing 
Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced 
in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 716–17 (1981)). 
 19. See id. 
 20. Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 954, 959 (1933). 
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has been cited as the source of the bar against character and prior bad 
acts evidence,21 but decisions to that effect had taken hold in 
American courts as early as 180722 and the bar ultimately became a 
staple of American jurisprudence.23 
In People v. Molineux, a highly influential decision in 1901, the 
New York Court of Appeals discussed the bar against prior bad acts 
evidence and laid out five exceptions under which prior bad acts were 
admissible.24  The court began by adducing rationales for the general 
bar against prior bad acts evidence, stating that unlike countries such 
as France, where the entirety of the accused’s life was subject to 
examination, “it is not permitted to show [the accused’s] former 
character or to prove his guilt of other crimes, merely for the purpose 
of raising a presumption that he who would commit them would be 
more apt to commit the crime in question.”25  Further, the court 
reasoned that: 
[i]t would be easier to believe a person guilty of one crime if it was 
known that he had committed another of a similar character, or, 
indeed, of any character; but the injustice of such a rule in courts of 
justice is apparent.  It would lead to convictions, upon the particular 
charge made, by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and 
to uniting evidence of several offenses to produce a conviction for a 
single one.26 
Despite this potential for prejudice, the prohibition on prior bad 
acts evidence was not absolute.27  After categorizing previous courts’ 
admissions of prior bad acts evidence, Judge Werner, in his majority 
 
 21. See id.; see also David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence 
Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 
1170 (1998). 
 22. See Leonard, supra note 21, at 1171; see also People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 
293 (N.Y. 1901) (“The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the 
state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment . . . 
aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . .  This rule, so universally 
recognized and so firmly established in all English-speaking lands, is rooted in that 
jealous regard for the liberty of the individual which has distinguished our 
jurisprudence from all others, at least from the birth of Magna Charta.”). 
 23. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1171–72. 
 24. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 293. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 294 (citing Coleman v. People, 55 N.Y. 81, 90 (1873)). 
 27. See Randolph N. Jonakait, People v. Molineux and Other Crime Evidence: 
One Hundred Years and Counting, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31 (2002); see also 
Molineux, 61 N.E. at 295–96 (citing Pierson v. People, 79 N.Y. 424 (1880); Coleman v. 
People, 58 N.Y. 555 (1874); Copperman v. People, 56 N.Y. 591 (1874)). 
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opinion, identified several exceptions to the prohibition.28  The 
majority in Molineux held that the bar against evidence of prior bad 
acts did not apply when the evidence helped establish: the 
defendant’s motive; his intent; that the commission of the charged 
conduct was deliberate and thereby the absence of accident or 
mistake by the defendant; the defendant’s identity; or that the 
defendant had committed prior bad acts as a part of a larger criminal 
enterprise which included the charged conduct, uniting the charged 
and uncharged conduct in a common scheme or plan.29  Prior bad act 
evidence was ruled inadmissible unless it served one of these 
enumerated purposes.30 
Judge Parker, concurring in the judgment, but dissenting as to the 
discussion of prior bad acts evidence, wrote an arguably even more 
influential opinion in Molineux.31  Judge Parker eschewed the five 
exceptions to the general bar against prior bad acts evidence, 
reasoning that no precedent had suggested that there was a finite set 
of clearly defined exceptions.32  Instead, Judge Parker argued that the 
prohibition against prior bad acts evidence focused on preventing the 
evidence from being offered to prove nothing more than a criminal 
propensity, and that the evidence should be admissible if it was 
otherwise relevant to proving the charged crime.33 
While Judge Werner’s majority opinion remains good law in New 
York,34 the Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975, used Judge 
Parker’s inclusive model of admissibility as the template for Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which governs prior bad act admissibility.35  
 
 28. See Jonakait, supra note 27, at 30. 
 29. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 294. 
 30. Interestingly, the entirety of Judge Werner’s substantial discussion of prior 
bad acts evidence was dicta, as the appeal was decided on the grounds of improperly 
admitted hearsay evidence. Junakait, supra note 27, at 27. 
 31. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 314 (Parker, J., concurring) (“Do the facts constituting 
the other crime actually tend to establish one or several elements of the crime 
charged?  If so, they may be proved. . . .  [I]t has never been held by any court of 
responsible authority that the people cannot prove the facts constituting another 
crime, when those facts also tend to establish that the defendant committed the crime 
for which he is on trial.”); see also Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s 
Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (2005). 
 32. See Molineux, 61 N.E. at 314. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., People v. Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d 32 (2001). 
 35. See Reed, supra note 31, at 204–12. 
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Forty-one states have since adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence 
with limited modifications.36 
B. Modern Jurisprudence and the Bar Against Prior Bad Acts 
Evidence 
1. Huddleston v. United States 
Since People v. Molineux, jurisdictions have gradually evolved and 
expanded the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence.  For example, 
in the early twentieth century, Ohio required that prior bad acts be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.37  The Ohio Supreme Court 
overturned that requirement in 1923, thereafter requiring only that 
the proof of commission be “substantial.”38  The New York Court of 
Appeals, which had identified five categorical exceptions to the 
prohibition of prior bad acts evidence in Molineux, has similarly 
expanded admissibility.  Additional exceptions to the prohibition 
against prior bad acts evidence have been identified39 for evidence 
that establishes the nature of the relationship between the victim and 
the defendant,40 that is inextricably interwoven with the charged 
conduct,41 that is necessary to complete a narrative of conduct,42 or 
that is necessary as background information.43 
Despite these incremental changes broadening the admission of 
prior bad acts, however, the nation’s most significant single change 
resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston v. United 
States in 1988.44  Prior to the Court’s decision, the circuits were split 
on whether Rule 404(b) required trial courts to make a preliminary 
finding that “the Government has proved the ‘other act’ by a 
 
 36. See Reed, supra note 31, at 212. 
 37. See Baxter v. State, 110 N.E. 456, 458 (Ohio 1914). 
 38. Scott v. State, 141 N.E. 19, 26 (Ohio 1923). 
 39. See People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1987). 
 40. See, e.g., People v. Valath, 867 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div. 2008). 
 41. See, e.g., People v. Higgins, 784 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (App. Div. 2004). 
 42. See, e.g., People v. Rojas, 760 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (N.Y. 2001). 
 43. See, e.g., People v. Sceravino, 598 N.Y.S.2d 296, 297 (App. Div. 1993).  A 
common use of this exception is for evidence of prior conduct that resulted in an 
order of protection (i.e. a restraining order).  This evidence is presented to explain a 
charge of criminal contempt against the defendant for violating the order. See, e.g., 
People v. Rock, 882 N.Y.S.2d 907, 907 (App. Div. 2009). 
 44. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
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preponderance of the evidence before it submits the evidence to the 
jury.”45 
Guy Huddleston, the defendant, was charged with selling stolen 
goods and possessing stolen property, both in interstate commerce.46  
He was accused of trying to sell a shipment of stolen tapes.47  The 
issue was whether he knew that the tapes were stolen.48  The 
Government sought to introduce evidence of two prior similar 
incidents in which the defendant sold goods at a drastic markdown.49  
The Government argued these sales, one of which was of televisions 
from the same “suspicious” source as the stolen tapes, indicated that 
the goods in all three sales were stolen.50  The Government argued 
that the other acts, then, were relevant to showing that the defendant 
had knowledge that the tapes in question were stolen because he had 
sold similar, presumably stolen, goods in the past.51  The relevance, 
and thus admissibility, of the prior sales ultimately turned on whether 
goods in the prior sales were stolen. 
The trial court admitted the evidence of the prior sales, but the 
Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, concluding that the 
Government had the burden to prove that the goods sold in the prior 
sales were stolen by a clear and convincing standard of evidence.52  In 
a rehearing, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a trial court could admit 
prior bad act evidence “if the proof shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant did in fact commit the act.”53 
The defendant argued to the Court that prior bad acts evidence 
should be subject to a preliminary fact finding by a trial court 
pursuant to FRE 104(a), thus requiring that a judge find that the prior 
bad acts were proven by a standard of proof at least as high as a 
preponderance of the evidence.54  The Court rejected this argument, 
 
 45. Id. at 682. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 683. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 686. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See United States v. Huddleston, 802 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 53. United States v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir. 1986)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 54. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question 
about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”); 
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687. 
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holding that a trial court only needed to screen the evidence pursuant 
to FRE 104(b).55  This determination marked a significant change for 
prior bad act admissibility. 
For background, the Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish 
between two types of preliminary facts: those determining the 
competence of evidence and those determining its conditional 
relevance.56  Preliminary facts determining competence receive a 
preliminary fact-finding by a trial judge under FRE 104(a).57  
Preliminary facts determining relevance do not receive a preliminary 
fact-finding by a court, but are submitted to the jury, subject to 
admission under FRE 104(b).58  An example of a preliminary fact that 
determines, or conditions, the competence of evidence is where a 
party seeks to offer a hearsay statement pursuant to the excited 
utterance exception to the bar against hearsay evidence.59  In that 
case, the preliminary fact determining competence is whether the 
statement was an excited utterance.60  Pursuant to FRE 104(a), a 
judge would perform a preliminary fact-finding and hear the evidence 
as to whether the speaker of the out of court statement was 
experiencing nervous excitement.  The judge would then determine if 
the statement was admissible under the excited utterance hearsay 
exception pursuant to 104(a).61  An example of a preliminary fact 
which conditions the relevance of evidence would be where a party 
seeks to introduce a statement to prove that the intended audience of 
the statement was put on notice.  Naturally, the statement is only 
relevant if the audience of the statement actually heard it, and thus 
was put on notice.62  Pursuant to 104(b), a judge would allow the 
statement to be entered into evidence and submitted to the jury if, 
given all the facts surrounding the statement, a reasonable juror could 
 
 55. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on 
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 
fact does exist.  The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the 
proof be introduced later.”); Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689–90. 
 56. See FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee’s note. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See 1 EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:6 
(2012); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 60. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 2:6. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s note. 
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find that the statement was heard by a preponderance of the 
evidence.63 
In Huddleston, the Court held that under FRE 104(b), a trial court 
should examine all of the available information and submit the prior 
bad acts evidence to the jury if the court concludes that a reasonable 
juror would be able to find any necessary conditional fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence (in Huddleston, that the prior sales 
were of stolen goods).64  Importantly, a trial court is not to consider 
the credibility of the evidence when it considers the evidence’s 
admission.65 
The Court held that a fact-finding pursuant to FRE 104(a) would 
be inconsistent with the legislative history surrounding FRE 404(b).66  
The Court cited the House Report which stated that the rule was 
intended to “plac[e] greater emphasis on admissibility than did the 
final Court version”67 and the Senate Report, which stated that “[t]he 
use of the word ‘may’ with respect to the admissibility of evidence of 
crimes, wrongs, or other acts is not intended to confer any arbitrary 
discretion on the trial judge.”68  The Court concluded that “Congress 
was not nearly so concerned with the potential prejudicial effect of 
Rule 404(b) evidence as it was with ensuring that restrictions would 
not be placed on the admission of such evidence.”69  Tellingly, the 
Court acknowledged that admitting the evidence pursuant to FRE 
104(b) was prioritizing the admission of evidence with less restriction 
over its “potential prejudicial effect.”70  The two goals are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive,71 but prior bad acts evidence has 
consistently been recognized as having a substantial prejudicial risk.72 
After citing legislative intent, the Court proceeded to explicitly 
acknowledge a fear that “unduly prejudicial evidence might be 
introduced under Rule 404(b),”73 anticipating a criticism of its 
decision.74  The Court, however, rejected that a higher standard of 
 
 63. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689–90 (1988). 
 64. See id. at 690. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 688. 
 67. Id. at 688 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7 (1973)). 
 68. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1277 at 24 (1974)). 
 69. Id. at 688–89. 
 70. Id. at 688. 
 71. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 72. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
 73. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691. 
 74. See, e.g., People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 (Colo. 1991). 
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evidence through a preliminary finding of fact pursuant to FRE 
104(a) was necessary to reduce this risk of prejudice.  Instead, the 
Court identified four sources of insulation from prejudice: 
[F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be 
offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy 
requirement of Rule 402—as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, 
from the assessment the trial court must make under Rule 403 to 
determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice . . . ; 
and fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that 
the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar 
acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for 
which it was admitted.75 
Requiring trial courts only to screen prior bad acts evidence under 
a minimal standard of proof instead of having them perform a 
preliminary fact-finding subsequently rippled throughout the states 
and created a stark contrast with states that continued to apply a 
higher standard of evidence,76 as supported initially by the Sixth 
Circuit in United States v. Huddleston.77 
Aside from this preliminary fact-finding, jurisdictions rejecting and 
those adopting Huddleston employ functionally similar approaches to 
prior bad acts admissibility.78  Courts inquire as to whether the 
evidence is being offered for a purpose other than proving a 
propensity for criminality.79  Courts then evaluate whether the 
evidence is relevant.80  Federal courts and jurisdictions that have 
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence perform this inquiry pursuant 
to FRE 402.81  Finally, courts determine whether the prejudicial risk 
 
 75. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691–92.  The first protection refers to the requirement 
that the evidence not be offered to prove a propensity for criminality, a concern that 
initially gave rise to the prohibition against prior bad act evidence.  For a discussion 
of the policy rationales underlying the prohibition against prior bad act evidence, see 
discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
 76. See discussion infra, Part I.D. 
 77. 802 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 78. Compare Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691–92, with State v. Hernandez, 784 A.2d 
1225, 1222 (N.J. 2001) (holding that courts must examine whether the prior bad acts 
evidence is being offered for a proper purpose and if its probative value outweighs its 
“apparent prejudice”). 
 79. See, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691; Hernandez, 784 A.2d at 1222. 
 80. See, e.g., Hernandez, 784 A.2d at 1222. 
 81. See, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687–88. 
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of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, in which 
case the evidence would be excluded.82 
C. Situating the Bar Against Prior Bad Acts Evidence Among 
the Rules of Evidence: A Story of Prejudice 
1. Limiting Prejudice Is at the Root of Many Rules of Evidence and 
Is Effectuated Through Witness Preparation 
FRE 102 states that the goals of the rules of evidence are to aid in 
ascertaining truth and “securing a just determination.”83  The Rules 
proscribe a number of forms of evidence as inadmissible, including 
testimony that is “legally irrelevant information, speculation, opinion 
and hearsay.”84  For obvious reasons, a limiting instruction to the jury 
that they should disregard testimony they have already heard can 
only mitigate so much of the prejudice inherent in hearing a witness 
offer hearsay statements that address a material fact in dispute or 
speculation as to the ultimate issue of a case.85  To limit such 
prejudicial and inadmissible testimony, attorneys must engage in 
witness preparation.86  To avoid prejudicing the opposing party, 
attorneys are expected not to elicit inadmissible testimony from their 
witnesses, whether intentionally or not, and deliberately doing so is 
expressly unethical.87  Avoiding prejudice is the policy rationale for 
numerous rules of evidence, which in turn is addressed as a 
preliminary matter by witness preparation.  The underlying 
assumption is that more prejudice is avoided by excluding the 
evidence through rule and preparation than is inadvertently created 
by the ensuing witness preparation. 
 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 688; see also FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 83. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 84. Green, supra note 13, at 706 (footnotes omitted). 
 85. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, “Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire”: Should 
the Judge or the Jury Decide the Question of Whether the Accused Committed an 
Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404?, 42 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 813, 822–23 (1998). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 
(1968) (“Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be 
considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances 
occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually 
inadvertently. . . .  It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury 
can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to disregard such information.”). 
 86. See discussion infra Part II. 
 87. See Green, supra note 13. 
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2. The Bar Against Prior Bad Acts Evidence: Limiting Prejudice 
A similar desire to minimize undue prejudice underlies the 
prohibition against prior bad acts evidence.88  Unsurprisingly, 
differing evidentiary philosophies regarding the prejudice caused by 
prior bad acts evidence is a primary reason that some courts have 
followed Huddleston and others have rejected it.89  Therefore, to 
distinguish the respective courts’ decisions, it is important to elucidate 
the theories of prejudice undergirding the prohibition of prior bad 
acts evidence generally. 
In 1894, the bar against prior bad act evidence was formulated 
specifically in terms of protecting the defendant from evidence that 
established nothing more than a propensity to commit crime and that 
did not address facts in issue.  In Makin v. Attorney-General for New 
South Wales, Lord Herschell held,  
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce 
evidence tending to shew [sic] that the accused has been guilty of 
criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the 
purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person 
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the 
offence for which he is being tried.90   
American courts had asserted the bar against prior bad acts evidence 
well before Lord Herschell in Makin,91 but the policy reasoning 
enunciated in Makin succinctly describes the pervasive and highly 
influential fear of such evidence’s prejudicial impact.92  The policy 
concerns of admitting uncharged prior bad acts have since been 
further elucidated into three general concerns. 
First, there is a fear of what has been termed “the danger of 
overvaluation.”93  Justice Jackson described this concern in Michelson 
v. United States:  
 
 88. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 1:3. 
 89. See generally Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2003) (quoting Makin v. Attorney-Gen. for N.S.W., [1894] A.C. 57 
(P.C.)). 
 90. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of Chances: Relying 
on the Concept of Relative Frequency to Admit Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 7 
CRIM. JUST. 16, 16 (1992). 
 91. See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901). 
 92. See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 1.2. 
 93. Thomas J. Leach, “Propensity” Evidence and FRE 404: A Proposed 
Amended Rule with an Accompanying “Plain English” Jury Instruction, 68 TENN. L. 
REV. 825, 828 (2001). 
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The inquiry [into character] is not rejected because character is 
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury 
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge.94   
Specifically, it is the fear that character or uncharged prior bad act 
evidence would be so effective that the jury would have difficulty 
discerning between the evidentiary burden for the charged conduct 
and the defendant’s guilt for collateral uncharged misconduct. 
Second, there is a fear of what has been termed “the danger of 
unwarranted punishment.”95  This has also been termed the 
“nullification prejudice,”96 and refers to the concern that a jury may 
conclude that the defendant deserves punishment for his character or 
for his prior uncharged bad acts, and would convict him on that basis, 
irrespective of the evidence pertaining to the charged conduct.97 
Third, there is a fear that the evidence will confuse the issues for 
the jury.  Courts fear that the evidence may lead to the 
“overcomplication of issues” and that “particularly if there is a 
dispute about whether the defendant committed the other acts, 
introduction of evidence concerning those acts could be time-
consuming and distract the factfinder from the central issues in the 
case.”98 
In sum, these three policy concerns are different manifestations of 
potential prejudice to the defendant.  There is a base of research 
indicating that evidence of criminal propensity may be impactful in 
practice.  Perhaps the most famous study of juror deliberations, the 
Chicago Jury Project, found that “the presumption of innocence 
operates only for defendants without prior criminal records.”99  
Furthermore, 
 
 94. 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948). 
 95. See Leach, supra note 93. 
 96. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1184. 
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(“Proof of character is excluded not because it has no probative value, but because it 
sometimes may lead a jury to convict the accused on the ground of bad character 
deserving punishment irrespective of guilt.  In addition, defendants should not be 
placed in a position of defending against crimes for which they are not charged.”). 
 98. Leonard, supra note 21, at 1185–86 (citing Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity 
to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 777 
(1981)). 
 99. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 1.2 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966)). 
TORTORA_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:41 PM 
2013] RECONSIDERING PRIOR BAD ACTS 1509 
[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct strips the defendant of the 
presumption of innocence.  If the judge admits a defendant’s 
uncharged misconduct and the jury thereby learns of the record, the 
jury will probably use a “different . . . calculus of probabilities” in 
deciding whether to convict.  The uncharged misconduct stigmatizes 
the defendant and predisposes the jury to find him liable or guilty.100 
Other studies, however, have suggested that prior bad act evidence 
is not so damning.  In a meta-analysis of mock jury studies, Larry 
Lauden and Ronald Allen found that the results were “all over the 
map.”101  Some reported studies found that evidence of prior 
convictions increased conviction rates by upwards of fifty percent, 
while others found that “inadmissible priors evidence was utilized by 
mock jurors only when it was favorable to defendants,” and that after 
deliberation, there was no difference in conviction rates based upon 
exposure to prior bad act evidence.102 
Studies of real trials, instead, consistently found that defendants 
with prior convictions were more likely to be convicted at trial.103  
These results persisted, however, even when jurors were not told 
about the defendant’s prior bad acts.104 
Despite the mixed empirical findings, legal scholars and jurists 
have rearticulated the three aforementioned policy reasons while 
selectively highlighting studies to assert that there is a prevailing 
prejudice inherent to prior bad acts evidence.105 
Nonetheless, requiring a preliminary finding of fact by a judge at a 
level at least as high as a preponderance of the evidence for the 
 
 100. Id. § 1.2 nn.11–13 (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966); 
Thomas J. Pickett, Admissibility of Evidence as to Separate and Distinct Crimes, 18 
NEB. L. BULL. 336 (1939); and People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (Cal. 1986) 
(“the most prejudicial evidence imaginable against an accused”)). 
 101. Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes 
Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 493, 500 (2011). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 503. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 420 N.W. 499, 508–10 (Mich. 1988); Victor J. Gold, 
Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
59, 68, 80 (1984) (colorfully comparing criminals to leopards in the minds of jurors in 
that neither are expected to change their spots); Edward Imwinkelried, The Use of 
Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines 
that Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 MIL. L. REV. 41, 47–
48 (1990); Sarah J. Lee, The Search for the Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior 
Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 224–25 nn.32–35 
(1998). 
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admissibility of prior bad acts evidence ultimately creates a need for 
witness preparation similar to that created by other rules of 
evidence.106  While, for example, hearsay, speculation, and opinion 
rules of evidence require witness preparation to purge those lines 
from prospective witness testimony, a preliminary showing of fact 
requires witnesses to recall and offer prior bad act testimony with 
such detail and specificity that it satisfies the pertinent standard of 
evidence.107 
D. Courts Divided Along Fears of Undue Prejudice: Huddleston 
Leniency Versus Higher Standards 
The division between courts about what standard to apply to the 
admission of prior bad acts evidence largely corresponds to how 
concerned courts are about its prejudicial value and whether they 
view a higher standard of evidence of the act’s commission as an 
effective prophylactic.108 
Federal courts, naturally, follow Huddleston, but states are divided 
on which model to follow.  A number of states have chosen to follow 
Huddleston, including Alaska,109 Alabama,110 California,111 
Connecticut,112 Georgia,113 Idaho,114 Kentucky,115 Indiana,116 
Louisiana,117 Maine,118 Massachusetts,119 Michigan,120 Mississippi,121 
 
 106. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 107. See discussion infra Part II.E for further treatment of the incentives for 
greater witness preparation through a need for detailed testimony created by higher 
standards of evidence for prior bad act admissibility. 
 108. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 831–36. 
 109. See Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Apr. 23, 2003). 
 110. See Ex parte Hinton, 548 So. 2d 562, 567 (Ala. 1989). 
 111. See People v. Virgil, 253 P.3d 553, 593 (Cal. 2011). 
 112. See State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1151 (Conn. 2005) (“We find the United 
States Supreme Court’s reasoning persuasive.  Much like the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, under our Code of Evidence, the protection against unfair prejudice 
emanates not from a requirement of a preliminary finding of fact by the trial court, 
but from four other sources.”); see also State v. Holly, 941 A.2d 372, 377 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2008) (holding that the jury must reasonably be able “to find that the defendant 
in fact had committed the uncharged act”). 
 113. See Freeman v. State, 486 S.E.2d 348, 351 (Ga. 1997). 
 114. See State v. Kay, 927 P.2d 897, 905 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]e find the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Huddleston to be persuasive.”). 
 115. See Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1997). 
 116. See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220–21 (Ind. 1997). 
 117. See State v. Barnes, 2011-1421, pp.15–16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/19/12); 100 So. 3d 
926, 936 (“The burden of proof in a pretrial hearing held in accordance with State v. 
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North Carolina,122 South Dakota,123 Vermont,124 Virginia,125 
Wisconsin,126 and Wyoming.127  Often the rationale is agreement with 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning or a desire for uniformity with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.128 
States that maintain preliminary fact-finding by a judge for prior 
bad acts evidence generally do so for one of two reasons: they follow 
pre-Huddleston precedent and have not expressly chosen whether to 
follow Huddleston; or, they have expressly rejected Huddleston, 
either by statute or decision.129  Texas requires that the prior bad acts 
be provable beyond a reasonable doubt.130  A number of states 
require a preliminary showing that the defendant committed the 
uncharged conduct by clear and convincing evidence, including 
 
Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), shall be identical to the burden of proof required by 
Federal Rules of Evidence Article IV, Rule 404.” (citing LA. CODE EVID. ANN. Art. 
1104)). 
 118. See State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 933 n.5 (Me. 1991) (holding that even though 
the defendant had been acquitted of a prior crime, previously charged conduct could 
still be submitted to the jury as a prior bad act in part because the standard for prior 
bad acts admissibility is only that a reasonable jury be able to find that the act was 
committed by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 119. See Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 732 N.E. 278, 280–81 (Mass. 2000). 
 120. See People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 126 (Mich. 1993), amended by 
520 N.W.2d 338 (Mich. 1994). 
 121. See Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 779 (Miss. 1997) (“[S]ufficient evidence 
must be shown, not necessarily by a preponderance of the evidence, for the jury to 
determine that the defendant actually committed the prior acts.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1999). 
 122. See State v. Stager, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (N.C. 1991) (“[W]e find the reasoning 
of Huddleston compelling.”). 
 123. See State v. Barber, 552 N.W.2d 817, 822 (S.D. 1996) (“This Court has 
previously rejected the notion that bad acts testimony must meet any standards of 
credibility before it may be admitted into evidence.”). 
 124. See State v. Robinson, 611 A.2d 852, 854 (Vt. 1992), abrogated on other 
grounds as stated in State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258 (Vt. 1996). 
 125. See Pavlick v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 920, 924–25 (Va. Ct. App. 1998). 
 126. See State v. Gray, 590 N.W.2d 918, 930 (Wis. 1999). 
 127. See Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1996). 
 128. See, e.g., State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1151 (Conn. 2005); State v. 
Schindler, 429 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), holding mod. by State v. Lee, 
499 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
 129. See Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Apr. 23, 2003); supra notes 133–55. 
 130. See Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 160–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“[T]rial 
court must, under rule 104(b), make an  initial determination . . . that jury could 
reasonably find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed extraneous 
offense.”). 
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Arizona,131 Delaware,132 the District of Columbia,133 Florida,134 Iowa,135 
Maryland,136 Nevada,137 New Hampshire,138 New Jersey,139 New 
York,140 North Dakota,141 Oklahoma,142 South Carolina,143 and 
Tennessee.144 
Minnesota and Nebraska both implemented a clear and convincing 
standard through statute.145  A few states require that the prior bad 
acts be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, including 
Colorado,146 Illinois,147 West Virginia,148 and Washington.149 
Because this Note is focused on the admission of prior bad acts 
evidence that a witness cannot fully recall, it is focused on how 
 
 131. See State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997). 
 132. See Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 734 (Del. 1988) (“The other crimes must be 
proved by evidence which is ‘plain, clear and conclusive.’” (quoting Renzi v. State, 
320 A.2d 711, 712 (Del. 1974))). 
 133. See Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1100 n.18, 1101 (D.C. 1996). 
 134. See Phillips v. State, 591 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 135. See State v. Howell, 557 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (requiring 
“clear proof”). 
 136. See Harris v. State, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (Md. 1991). 
 137. See Winiarz v. State, 820 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Nev. 1991) (“Before evidence of 
prior bad acts may be admitted, there must be clear and convincing evidence that 
such acts actually occurred.”). 
 138. See State v. Michaud, 610 A.2d 354, 356 (N.H. 1992) (requiring “clear proof 
that the defendant committed the prior offense”). 
 139. See State v. Hernandez, 734 A.2d 1225, 1235 (N.J. 2001). 
 140. See People v. Robinson, 503 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1986) (“other crime 
evidence” must be “established by clear and convincing evidence” when it is used to 
prove the Molineux exception of identity through a defendant’s distinctive modus 
operandi). 
 141. See State v. Schmeets, 2009 ND 163, ¶15, 772 N.W.2d 623, 629. 
 142. See Welch v. State, 2000 OK Crim. App. 8, ¶8, 2 P.3d 356, 365. 
 143. See State v. Smith, 387 S.E.2d 245, 247 (S.C. 1989). 
 144. See State v. McCary, 922 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tenn. 1996). 
 145. See State v. Wilson, 556 N.W.2d 643, 652–53 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996); Ture v. 
State, 353 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Minn. 1984). 
 146. See People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 n.4 (Colo. 1991) (“Given the clearly 
recognized potential for prejudice inherent in other-crime evidence, it seems more 
reasonable to us . . . to require the trial court to be satisfied by a preponderance of 
the evidence of the conditionally relevant facts . . . and not merely to determine 
whether the jury ‘could reasonably find’ the conditionally relevant facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 
690 (1988))). 
 147. See People v. Oaks, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1348 (Ill. 1996), abrogated on other 
grounds in In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. 2000) (requiring “more than a mere 
suspicion”). 
 148. See State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 526–28 (W. Va. 1994). 
 149. See State v. Hartzell, 237 P.3d 928, 935 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
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different standards of proof affect the admission of evidence based, in 
part, on the credibility of the witness and evidence.  It is therefore 
important to note that some jurisdictions that have rejected 
Huddleston, such as Texas and South Carolina, nonetheless exclude 
the credibility of prior bad acts testimony from the trial judge’s 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence, just as in Huddleston.150  
Meanwhile, others, such as Nebraska and West Virginia, reserve 
credibility for the trial judge under the higher standard of proof.151  
For example, while New Jersey and Delaware both require that a trial 
court find that the prior bad acts evidence be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence,152 a New Jersey court may consider the 
credibility of the witness alleging the prior bad acts evidence in 
making that preliminary determination, but a Delaware court may 
not.153 
Courts that have rejected Huddleston often cite concerns for 
prejudicing the defendant by admitting prior bad acts evidence.  In an 
en banc decision, the Arizona Supreme Court supported its rejection 
of Huddleston’s use of 104(b) in lieu of a preliminary finding of clear 
and convincing evidence of commission by reasoning that 
[prior bad acts] evidence is quite capable of having an impact 
beyond its relevance to the crime charged and may influence the 
jury’s decision on issues other than those on which it was received, 
despite cautionary instructions from the judge. . . .  Because of the 
high probability of prejudice from the admission of prior bad acts, 
the court must ensure that the evidence against the defendant 
 
 150. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690; State v. Wilson, 545 S.E.2d 827, 830 (S.C. 
2001) (holding that credibility of prior bad acts testimony “was an issue for the jury’s 
consideration”); Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. App. 1996) (“The 
conditional fact at issue in this case was whether Gunnlaugsson made the racially 
defamatory statement attributed to him by Taylor. . . .  To the extent that the court 
made its own determination of Taylor’s credibility rather than leaving that 
determination to the jury, it exceeded the scope of its discretion under rule 104(b).”). 
 151. See State v. Floyd, 763 N.W.2d 91, 98 (Neb. 2009) (affirming trial court’s 
admission of prior bad acts evidence where trial court considered witness’s 
credibility); McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at 527 n.16 (holding that the trial court should 
weigh the credibility of prior bad acts evidence) (quoting Daniels v. United States, 
613 A.2d 342, 347 (D.C. App. 1992)). 
 152. See supra notes 132, 139 and accompanying text. 
 153. Compare State v. Dennis, Nos. A-1055-07, A-3147-07, 2011 WL 709721, at *11 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 2, 2011) (affirming the admission of prior bad acts 
testimony where the trial court determined that the witness who offered it was 
sufficiently credible to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard), with 
Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 427–28 (Del. 2011) (“[S]worn testimony [of prior bad 
acts] constitutes clear and convincing evidence for purposes of admissibility, with 
credibility to be decided by the trier of fact.”). 
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directly establishes “that the defendant took part in the collateral 
act, and to shield the accused from prejudicial evidence based upon 
‘highly circumstantial inferences.’” . . .  To allow a lesser standard in 
a criminal case is to open too large a possibility of prejudice.154 
Ultimately, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was based upon 
a fear of prejudice to the defendant, and the higher standard was 
treated as a way to insulate against prejudice.  Similarly, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the clear and convincing 
standard “is a necessary component of the fortification against the 
possibility of unfair prejudice when a court determines whether 
relevant other-crime evidence should be admitted in the trial of an 
accused.”155 
Colorado and West Virginia both adopted a preponderance of the 
evidence standard for the admission of prior bad acts evidence, but 
rejected Huddleston in doing so.156  In an en banc decision, the 
Colorado Supreme Court reasoned that using FRE 104(b) was likely 
to create undue prejudice for the defendant.157  The court held that 
the problem with such a standard was that “regardless of the jury’s 
ultimate determination of the conditional fact, the jury might well 
convict the defendant not on the basis of the strength of the 
prosecution’s case but because the defendant is a person of bad 
character.”158  In other words, if the jury were given the evidence, it 
might be prejudiced even if it did not find the conditional fact that the 
defendant was responsible for the prior bad acts.  West Virginia’s 
Supreme Court echoed these concerns, holding that  
[t]o expose the jury to Rule 404(b) evidence before the trial court 
has determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts 
were committed and that the defendant committed them would in 
our view subject the defendant to an unfair risk of conviction 
regardless of the jury’s ultimate determination of these facts.159   
“These facts” refer to the conditional facts that the defendant was the 
perpetrator of the prior bad acts offered into evidence.  These courts, 
 
 154. State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Vivian M. Rodriguez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts 
Under the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B): The Weighing of 
Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 457 (1993)). 
 155. State v. Hernandez, 784 A.2d 1225, 1235 (N.J. 2001). 
 156. People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 n.4 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); McGinnis, 455 
S.E.2d at 526–27. 
 157. Garner, 806 P.2d at 372. 
 158. Id. 
 159. State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994) (emphasis added). 
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in rejecting Huddleston, do not explain how a juror may actually be 
influenced by prior bad acts that the juror does not believe a 
defendant committed due to a lack of proof of commission.  Their 
criticisms of Huddleston have been challenged as relying on 
incomplete and flawed reasoning and for being conclusory.160 
In addition to the arguments offered by courts that have rejected 
Huddleston,161 there are other circumstances in which a Huddleston 
standard may result in greater prejudice against the defendant.162  A 
defendant may be especially prejudiced by prior bad acts evidence 
under Huddleston’s minimal standard of proof when the prior bad 
acts are being offered with little proof but through a chorus of 
multiple witnesses.163  Even though a jury may be instructed that it 
should not consider prior bad acts evidence unless the prior bad acts 
have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence,164 jurors 
“would naturally be inclined to ascribe significance to the fact of 
multiple accusations even if they find the foundational testimony 
inadequate to prove up the accusations.”165  The defendant would be 
unable to disprove accusations that were untrue and could not be 
proven, but were nonetheless credible in the eyes of the jury purely 
due to quantity. 
E. Higher Standards of Proof of Commission Require Greater 
Amounts of Detail by Witnesses 
Under Huddleston, the bar for the admissibility of prior bad acts 
evidence is low with regards to proof of commission; the evidence is 
evaluated by the jury pursuant to FRE 104(b), and the trial judge 
intervenes only to screen the prior bad acts if, given all of the 
available evidence, proof of commission does not clear a “minimal 
standard of proof.”166  As a result, in jurisdictions that have adopted 
Huddleston, even vague or unparticularized prior bad acts may be 
offered as testimony and may be admissible if they are offered for a 
non-propensity reason and if their prejudicial value does not 
 
 160. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 832–36. 
 161. See, e.g., State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Ariz. 1997); Garner, 806 P.2d 
at 372; McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d at 527. 
 162. See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 85. 
 163. See id. at 843–44. 
 164. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 9:64. 
 165. Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 844. 
 166. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).  For a discussion of 
prior bad act admissibility under 104(b) see supra Part I.B.1. 
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substantially outweigh their probative value.167  The trial court does 
not even consider the credibility of the witnesses offering the 
evidence.168  A witness, therefore, can testify to the incompleteness of 
his or her memory as to prior bad acts without suffering any 
evidentiary consequence.  A lack of detail is not fatal, and can be 
explored on cross-examination by the defendant. 
For courts that do not follow Huddleston and apply a higher 
standard of proof, however, prior bad acts evidence is scrutinized 
more closely, and the details or specificity a witness provides can bear 
on whether the testimony is deemed admissible.169  For example, the 
clarity and certainty of a witness’s testimony may have a bearing on 
its admissibility.170  Vague, circumstantial evidence of prior bad acts 
has been found to be insufficient under a jurisdiction’s clear and 
convincing standard of proof.171  Uncorroborated testimony of prior 
crimes can be insufficient, and render the allegations inadmissible, 
where “there are no details about the circumstances” of the prior bad 
acts.172 
 
 167. See, e.g., State v. Burdick, No. 2008-158, 2009 WL 428058, at *4 (Vt. Feb. 4, 
2009) (holding that the victim could testify to vague, unparticularized prior bad acts 
by the defendant under Huddleston “without a preliminary finding by the trial court 
that the act actually occurred” and that credibility was reserved for the jury to 
decide); Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo. 1999) (another jurisdiction which 
adopted Huddleston held that the allegations made by former foster children with 
failing memories of sexual misconduct did not need to be proven by the prosecutor 
under FRE 404(b) to be admissible). 
 168. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690 (“[T]he trial court neither weighs credibility nor 
makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 169. See supra notes 133–56 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., State v. Oates, 611 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming 
the admission of uncorroborated prior bad acts testimony where the witness 
“provided clear and unequivocal testimony”). 
 171. See, e.g., State v. Anthony, 189 P.3d 366, 371–72 (Ariz. 2008) (“The trial court 
concluded that there was ‘circumstantial evidence that something sexual happened’ 
and that there was a possible ‘inference to be drawn’ of ‘untoward’ activity.  The 
appropriate question . . . however, is whether there was clear and convincing 
evidence.”). Compare State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 933 n.5 (Me. 1991) (a jurisdiction 
that has adopted Huddleston allowing prior bad acts evidence even where the 
defendant had been acquitted of the conduct), with Kimberly v. State, 757 P.2d 1326, 
1328 (Nev. 1988) (a jurisdiction requiring clear and convincing evidence rejecting 
prior bad acts evidence after considering that there were circumstances that detracted 
from its reliability and that the grand jury had declined to indict the defendant for 
those acts). But see State v. D.K., No. A-3688-06T2, 2008 WL 3539935, at *5 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 15, 2008) (holding that a victim of child molestation’s 
testimony as to uncharged incidents of sexual assault, while “somewhat vague and 
uncorroborated,” was sufficient under a clear and convincing evidence standard). 
 172. State v. Timmerman, 480 N.W.2d 411, 420 (Neb. 1992). 
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Another illustrative example of the role of detail in establishing 
credibility is in the context of probable cause for a search warrant 
based on information provided by an informant.  When determining 
if probable cause exists, courts evaluate the details an informant 
offers in determining the informant’s credibility.173  The detail a 
witness can provide thereby correlates to the witness’s credibility.  
Although under Huddleston the required showing of proof of 
commission is “minimal” and courts are not to consider the credibility 
of the witnesses,174 courts are more demanding in jurisdictions that 
require higher standards of proof. 
II.  THE RISK OF FALSE MEMORIES AND MISINFORMATION 
In order to elicit detailed witness testimony, attorneys interview 
their witnesses to determine the boundaries of their witnesses’ 
recollections and prepare their witnesses to testify effectively.  The 
more detail that an attorney seeks to elicit, the more questions the 
attorney is likely to ask the witness.  This Part begins by discussing 
the role of witness interviewing and preparation in the trial process.  
The ethics of witness interviewing and preparation are discussed, 
distinguishing between prosecutors and other attorneys.  Part II.B 
then explores how various types of questions attorneys ask 
prospective witnesses during interviews and preparation can alter 
witnesses’ memories of events and introduce prejudicial false 
testimony. 
A. Witness Preparation: Foundation of Trial Preparation and 
Potential Source of Falsehood 
1. Witness Preparation Is Fundamental to Litigation 
Witness preparation is a standard, ubiquitous, and foundational 
aspect of litigation.175  Courts themselves have recognized its role: the 
North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is not improper 
for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to explain the 
 
 173. See e.g., People v. DiFalco, 610 N.E.2d 352, 355 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Hicks, 
378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (App. Div. 1975); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶8, 142 P.3d 
1155, 1160. 
 174. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). 
 175. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 278–79 (1989) 
(“American litigators regularly use witness preparation, and virtually all would, upon 
reflection, consider it a fundamental duty of representation and a basic element of 
effective advocacy.”). 
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applicable law in any given situation and to go over before trial the 
attorney’s questions and the witness’ answers so that the witness will 
be ready for his appearance in court, will be more at ease because he 
knows what to expect, and will give his testimony in the most effective 
manner that he can.”176  The West Virginia Supreme Court has even 
held that “an attorney has an ethical duty to prepare a witness” for 
testimony.177 
Witness preparation can serve many purposes such as: gathering 
facts both about an incident and the witness’s recollection; rehearsing 
the witness’s testimony; refreshing the witness’s memory as to prior 
statements;178 and even discussing the testimony of other witnesses 
and offering the witness an opportunity to reconsider his testimony 
given that information.179  The benefits to giving witnesses the content 
of another witness’s statements is to give the witness the chance to 
reevaluate their own level of certainty and to prevent them from 
becoming flustered at trial by contrary statements or documents 
presented by other witnesses.180 
In addition, attorneys are expected to prepare witnesses to testify 
at trial so as to avoid any violations of the rules of evidence by 
eliminating potentially prejudicial and impermissible statements, such 
as hearsay, speculation, or opinion testimony.181 
 
 176. Liisa Renée Salmi, Don’t Walk the Line: Ethical Considerations in Preparing 
Witnesses for Deposition and Trial, 18 REV. LITIG. 135, 140–41 (1999) (quoting State 
v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979)). 
 177. State ex rel. Means v. King, 520 S.E.2d 875, 882 (W. Va. 1999). 
 178. Prosecutors, however, are actively disincentivized from recording any witness 
statements because any statements they record must be turned over to the defense. 
See Gershman, supra note 2, at 851–53; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (2012) (requiring 
the disclosure of witness statements that (1) were signed or adopted by the witness, 
(2) contain a substantially verbatim recital of any oral statement made by the witness 
and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such statement, or (3) contain 
any statement made by the witness to a grand jury); People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 
881 (N.Y. 1961), codified at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2013) 
(requiring disclosure of any recorded statement by a witness which pertains to the 
subject matter of the witness’s testimony). 
 179. See Richard Alcorn, “Aren’t You Really Telling Me . . . ?”: Ethics and 
Preparing Witness Testimony, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2008, at 17–18. See generally 
Applegate, supra note 175. 
 180. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 304–05. 
 181. See Gershman, supra note 2 at 857; Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness 
Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995); see also discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
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2. The Ethics of Witness Preparation 
Attorneys are expected to uphold certain basic ethical behaviors 
when interviewing, preparing and questioning witnesses.  Nearly all of 
the states have adopted some form of the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) or other 
similar rules of conduct.182  Most of the states that have not done so 
had adopted rules of conduct before the promulgation of the Model 
Rules, and these states recognize standards of conduct for witness 
preparation and testimony that are largely similar to the Model 
Rules.183  The Model Rules prohibit attorneys from offering “evidence 
the lawyer knows to be false.”184  Further, a lawyer shall not “assist a 
witness to testify falsely,”185 “counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,”186 
or “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”187 
Professor Charles Wolfram has argued that advising “a witness 
about the law or about desired testimony before seeking the 
witness’[s] own version of events comes dangerously near subornation 
of perjury.”188  By that measure, telling a witness what testimony 
would be useful and then asking the witness about what they recall 
with seeming interest more in such testimony over the truth only 
pushes up against the farthest bounds of ethical conduct.  Even 
though “historically the cases demonstrate that only the most 
egregious professional conduct violations have been disciplined, dicta 
 
 182. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 138. 
 183. Id. at n.12. 
 184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011) (“(a) A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct 
a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer 
. . . (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer, the lawyer’s 
client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.  A lawyer may refuse to offer 
evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is false.”) 
 185. Id. R. 3.4 (“A lawyer shall not: . . . (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a 
witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law 
. . . .”). 
 186. Id. R. 1.29(d). 
 187. Id. R. 8.4(c). 
 188. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Teaching Ethics in Evidence, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 961, 967 n.10 (2003) (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.3 (1986)). 
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from some opinions suggest that the standard to which attorneys may 
be held is actually much higher.”189 
Nonetheless, for the hypothetical prosecutor from the introduction, 
in a jurisdiction that has rejected Huddleston, there is an incentive to 
keep asking questions of the complainant to elicit extra details until 
the complainant’s memory is exhausted,190 and continued questioning 
is squarely within the ethical responsibilities of a prosecutor, and may 
even be paradigmatic zealous advocacy.191  Given the responsibilities 
of prosecutors as truth-seekers, in trials where the consequences are 
the forfeiture of a defendant’s freedom, it is of paramount importance 
to appreciate whether and how such questions, while ethical, may 
nevertheless be prejudicial to the administration of justice through 
unintentionally distorting the memories of witnesses. 
B. Risks of Witness Preparation in Creating False Testimony 
1. Analysis from Legal Scholarship: The Risks of Even Careful 
Witness Preparation 
Despite the significant role of witness preparation in litigation, it 
presents many opportunities for the introduction of falsehood into 
the record.192  Attorneys and legal scholars have promulgated a 
number of analyses on the ways in which an attorney could 
deliberately or unintentionally, and with the best of intentions, play a 
role in a witness forming false memories or memory distortions.  
These analyses integrate research from social psychology, personal 
experiences, and “intuitive and impressionistic” conclusions.193 
The deliberate and thereby unethical methods through which 
attorneys can elicit false or manipulated testimony from witnesses are 
well-documented.194  An attorney might tell a witness that particular 
testimony would be necessary or helpful despite knowing that it 
would be false.  The attorney might then ask that witness about what 
 
 189. Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Note, Professional Conduct and the Preparation of 
Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of “Coaching”, 1 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 389, 395 (1987). 
 190. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 286–87. 
 192. See generally Applegate, supra note 175, Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi, 
supra note 176. 
 193. Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1083, 1092 n.18 (1975); see also Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi, supra 
note 175. 
 194. See, e.g., Wydick, supra note 181. 
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the witness knew, expecting the witness’s answer to be in conformity 
with what the attorney wanted to hear.195  Knowingly eliciting such 
false testimony is both unlawful and unethical.196  Of course, an 
attorney could more subtly achieve the same ends, without risking the 
same ethical and legal sanction.  An oft-cited example is “the Lecture 
scene” in the film and book Anatomy of a Murder.197  In this scene, an 
attorney is defending a client accused of murdering his wife’s lover.  
When the defendant offers an undesirable fact, his attorney stops the 
interview and provides a detailed lecture on the laws of homicide and 
its possible defenses, until the defendant understands that he can only 
prevail with an insanity defense.198  At that point, the client describes 
his state of mind at the time of the murder so as to support an insanity 
defense.199 
Returning to the case of the prosecutor and complainant from the 
opening passage of this Note, there are a number of ways in which the 
prosecutor might elicit false testimony from the complainant while 
believing he is helping ensure justice and secure her an order of 
protection.  After the complainant made it clear that she could not 
remember details about any prior incidents with her ex-boyfriend, the 
prosecutor could have stopped the complainant and begun his own 
“Lecture scene.”  He could have explained that their jurisdiction 
required a certain minimum amount of proof for the admissibility of 
prior bad acts, and then he could have provided the types of details 
for hypothetical bad acts which he was confident would satisfy any 
clear and convincing standard of admissibility.  Indeed, having a 
witness testify to details about an event he or she cannot remember is 
no more ethical than having a witness change his or her recollection 
of one that did.  Such a prosecutor is not the intended focus of this 
Note, however.  An attorney, civil or criminal, that is willing to elicit 
false testimony or suborn perjury to increase the likelihood of the 
admission of prior bad acts, or any other evidence, is best targeted 
criminally and through ethical sanction, and not through a 
reconsideration of rules of evidence.200 
 
 195. See id. at 19.  Richard Wydick has called “knowingly and overtly inducing” a 
witness to testify falsely “Grade One witness coaching.” Id. 
 196. Id. at 18. 
 197. See id. at 25. 
 198. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 32 (1958); see also Applegate, 
supra note 175, at 302; Wydick, supra note 181, at 25–26. 
 199. See TRAVER, supra note 198, at 46–49. 
 200. See generally Wydick, supra note 181, at 52. 
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More troubling are the ways in which an attorney can 
unintentionally and unknowingly change a witness’s testimony or 
recollection through witness preparation, thereby creating prejudice.  
At the highest level, findings by psychologists suggest that the very 
act of interviewing can produce “distorted and inaccurate 
testimony.”201 
Another less sweeping concern is the unconscious impact an 
attorney can have on a witness through the dynamics of respect, 
power, and an innocuous desire to please.  Because “[p]arties can 
hardly be expected to interview the potential witnesses in relatively 
detached ways . . . the future witness is likely to try to adapt himself to 
expectations mirrored” in the attorney.202  As a result, “gaps in [a 
witness’s] memory may even unconsciously be filled out by what he 
thinks accords with the lawyer’s expectations and are in tune with his 
thesis.  Later, in court, these additions to memory images may appear 
to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his original 
perceptions.”203  This mirroring can occur absent any partisan 
signaling from the attorney.204  In a review of witness preparation’s 
common and best practices, John Applegate summarized his findings 
that “[e]ven without partisan motivations, people commonly try to 
please their audience.  Thus, the witness will try to please the lawyer 
during witness preparation, who in turn will further encourage and 
reinforce the helpful tendencies in the witness’s story.”205 
The prejudicial threat of such a dynamic is immediately apparent, 
and is particularly alarming for prosecutors.  While civil attorneys are 
expected ethically and professionally to prepare their witnesses in 
developing testimony, including down to the point of word selection 
(in the interests of clarity and not substantive change),206 prosecutors 
are first and foremost seekers of justice and truth.207  Yet by simply 
having read a case file and formed an opinion about the case or about 
the culpability of the defendant, the prosecutor may impact a witness 
with his “one-sided attitude.”208  For our hypothetical prosecutor and 
 
 201. J. Alexander Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 487, 
537 (2002). 
 202. Damaska, supra note 193, at 1094. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Applegate, supra note 175, at 332. 
 206. See Tanford, supra note 201, at 540–41. 
 207. See Gershman, supra note 2, at 851. 
 208. Damaska, supra note 193, at 1094. 
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complainant, the implications of this possibility are real and 
immediate.  By believing his complainant and believing in the guilt 
and menacing history of the defendant, perhaps in part by having 
seen the defendant’s criminal history, the prosecutor’s earnest 
attempts to probe the boundaries of the complainant’s memory may 
convey his confidence in the defendant’s guilt.  This could result in 
the complainant “unconsciously” filling out “gaps” in her memory, 
creating details where there were none.209  Prejudice against the 
defendant is created when the complainant testifies and she becomes 
certain that “these additions to memory” are her own recollection.210  
When a witness develops confidence in such false memories, it has 
been called “memory hardening,” and is a well-recognized dynamic.211 
Leading questions asked during witness preparation may also 
result in inaccurate testimony and prejudice.  In an attorney-client, 
and especially a prosecutor-witness relationship, where the entire 
authority of the government hangs overhead, the attorney is unlikely 
to be challenged by the witness in how he frames questions.  As a 
result, any leading questions he asks can be exceptionally impactful.  
The threat presented by leading questions is most pronounced and 
well-recognized for child witnesses.212  Even though adults have a 
“greater capacity to fight off such questions,”213 they are still 
susceptible to having their recollections affected by such questions,214 
and “their hostility to them can itself lead to [memory] distortion.”215  
Furthermore, questions do not have to be expressly leading to have 
an impact on a witness’s memory.  A question’s “form and context” 
can bias memories and can be functionally leading all the same: “The 
very syntax of our language carries suggestion as to how events 
happen, including implications as to how one thing causes another.”216  
Influencing witnesses through language can even “be brought about 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1987); Wydick, supra note 
181, at 10–11. 
 212. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990) (affirming the reversal of a 
conviction for sexual crimes and holding that the victim’s allegations of abuse were 
based on suggestive and leading questioning by an interrogator). 
 213. Paul C. Wohlmuth, Jurisprudence and Memory Research, 8 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 249, 255 (1997). 
 214. See generally Elizabeth Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness 
Report, 7 J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 550 (1975). 
 215. Wohlmuth, supra note 213, at 255. 
 216. Id. 
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without conscious design. . . .  Thus, suggestibility and other distortion 
is an interactive phenomenon staged by the routine configuring of the 
question and answer process.”217 
Finally, offering witnesses access to the testimony of other 
witnesses or other evidence is a recognized practice in witness 
preparation.218  As a general practice, the legal benefits of providing 
witnesses with this information during preparation have been 
discussed previously.219  Nonetheless, there is a risk of creating false 
memories because “[w]hen memories are vague, people fill in the 
gaps with what they believe to be true or what they infer to be true.  
In short, the process of piecing together the past can often be highly 
prone to distortion.”220 
2. Psychological Research on Memory and Witnesses: Reason for 
Concern About False Testimony and More Questions 
While much of the scholarly literature on the prejudicial risks of 
witness preparation draws on social psychology research,221 that 
research is based on experiments, often run on college students, that 
attempt to recreate the experience of being a witness to an incident.222  
In a series of foundational studies, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus 
elucidated many of the risk factors for false memories and 
confabulation.223 
One important finding is that the simple phrasing of a question 
asked of a witness can ultimately impact the witness’s perceptions of 
an incident and thus his or her recollection.224  In one study, 
participants were shown a car accident between two vehicles.225  
Participants were then asked to estimate the speed of the vehicles in 
the accident.  When the participants were asked about the speed of 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 304. 
 219. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 220. Elizabeth Loftus, Memory and its Distortions, in 2 THE G. STANLEY HALL 
LECTURE SERIES 123, 137 (Alan Kraut ed., 1982). 
 221. See generally Damaska, supra note 193; Salmi, supra note 176; Wydick, supra 
note 181. 
 222. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 214, at 560. 
 223. See, e.g., Elizabeth Loftus et al., Semantic Integration of Verbal Information 
into a Visual Memory, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 
19 (1978); Elizabeth Loftus & John Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile 
Destruction, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING VERBAL BEHAV. 585 (1974). 
 224. See Loftus & Palmer, supra note 223, at 586. 
 225. Id. 
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the vehicles when they “smashed” into each other, participants 
reported significantly higher rates of speed than other participants 
who were asked about the speed of the vehicles when they 
“contacted” each other.226  A week after the experiment, the 
experimenters followed up with the participants.227  The participants 
were asked whether they saw any broken glass in the accident, of 
which there had been none.228  The participants who were asked about 
the speed of the cars using the word “smashed” were significantly 
more likely to report having seen non-existent broken glass.229  The 
phrasing of the question, then, not only impacted the interpretation of 
the incident in terms of vehicular speed, but also permanently 
affected the participants’ substantive recollection of the scene itself.   
Similar experiments have reinforced these findings.  For example, 
after showing participants a video of a car accident, without any 
broken headlights, those asked whether they saw “the” broken 
headlight were more likely to report having seen it than were those 
asked if they saw “a” broken headlight.230  In another study, 
participants were shown a picture of a basketball player.231  
Participants were then asked either “how tall” the player was or “how 
short” the player was.  Those asked how tall the player was reported a 
significantly taller player than those asked “how short” the same 
player was.232  These results were also found when questioning people 
about their past personal experiences.233  For example, participants 
asked about how often they had headaches while using the word 
“frequently” in the question reported having three times as many 
headaches as those asked the same question that used the word 
“occasionally” instead.234 
Questions that presuppose facts, whether intentionally or not, can 
significantly impact witnesses’ recollections just as a question’s 
 
 226. Id.  The witnesses reported the speeds of the vehicles differently based on the 
verb used to describe the impact, with reported speeds decreasing from “smashed”, 
to “collided,” “bumped,” “hit,” and “contacted,” in descending order. Id. 
 227. Id. at 587. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.. 
 230. Loftus, supra note 214, at 562. 
 231. Id. at 561 (citing R. Harris, Answering Questions Containing Marked and 
Unmarked Adjectives and Adverbs, 97 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 399 (1973)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id.  Participants were asked either “Do you get headaches frequently, and, if 
so, how often?” or “Do you get headaches occasionally, and, if so, how often?” Id. 
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phrasing can.235  Participants shown footage of a car accident were 
then asked whether they recalled seeing a yield sign.236  Many 
participants who were not shown a yield sign but had its existence 
suggested by the question ultimately recalled seeing the sign.237  
Furthermore, they provided longer descriptions of the sign they never 
actually saw than did those who were shown a scene with a yield 
sign.238 
Studies have found, however, that participants discriminate 
between sources of information when accepting presupposed facts as 
true.  When questioning included presupposed and false facts (such as 
when asked about a yield sign that didn’t exist), whether participants 
remembered the presupposed facts varied based upon how biased the 
provider of the presupposed facts seemed.239  In particular, where 
participants were given presupposed information about a car accident 
from a neutral bystander, they “remembered” the presupposed facts, 
just as in previous experiments.240  When the information came from 
the driver responsible for the accident, however, the witnesses did not 
remember the presupposed information.241  The implication is that 
people have the ability to filter information based upon the 
appearance of objectivity.  As a result, an attorney reading from a file 
or presenting an objective perspective may have the ability to 
influence a witness’s memory differently from one presenting himself 
as a partisan. 
With regards to presenting witnesses with evidence or other 
witnesses’ testimony, empirical data presents mixed results on the 
benefits and risks of creating false memories.  The testimonial and 
legal benefits of the practice as well as its possible impact on creating 
false memories has been discussed previously.242  It is important to 
note additionally that experiments have found that cued recall can 
help people more fully access their stored memories, such that access 
to additional information may unlock otherwise unavailable 
 
 235. See generally Loftus, supra note 223; Jonathon Schooler et al., Qualities of the 
Unreal, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 175 
(1986). 
 236. Schooler et al., supra note 235, at 175. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See David Dodd & Jeffrey Bradshaw, Leading Questions and Memory: 
Pragmatic Constraints, 19 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 695 (1980). 
 240. Id. at 695–701. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See supra notes 180, 220 and accompanying text. 
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memories.243  In one study, participants were able to recall four times 
as many news stories from the previous night along with supporting 
details when they were provided with the headline of the stories as a 
cue as opposed to when they were asked an open-ended question 
about how many stories they could recall.244 
Applying these psychology experiments directly to a real world 
dialogue between an attorney and client, or prosecutor and 
complainant such as those described in the opening passage of this 
Note, is fraught with complication.  The impact of phrasing, 
presupposed facts, and cued recall doubtlessly plays a significant role 
in recall and memory formation.245  Returning to our hypothetical 
prosecutor and complainant, however, parsing out the impact of a 
question’s phrasing from the emotional impact of having been 
harassed, or from the visual stimuli surrounding the complainant as 
she navigated the lobby and offices of the prosecutor’s office, is far 
from straight-forward.246  For example, adrenaline and other stress 
hormones have been found to impact memory during an incident, 
with moderate amounts enhancing it and large amounts potentially 
impairing it.247  Moreover, having experienced stalking may have 
affected the complainant’s memory of prior incidents in ways that 
college students wouldn’t necessarily share in a laboratory setting.248 
Among the most troubling and important aspects of memory 
research are the findings on how witnesses regard their own false 
memories.  In the words of Elizabeth Loftus, “Memory is malleable. 
. . .  You might relate a story to a friend but unwittingly include some 
 
 243. See Loftus, supra note 220, at 129–30. 
 244. Id. at 130–31. 
 245. See supra notes 222–42. See generally, Loftus, supra note 220. 
 246. See, e.g., Rick E. Ingram, External Validity Issues in Mood and Memory 
Research, 4 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 57–62 (1989) (discussing external 
validity issues in research on the interaction between mood and memory). 
 247. See NEURAL PLASTICITY AND MEMORY: FROM GENES TO BRAIN IMAGING ch. 
13.3 (Federico Bermúdez-Rattoni ed., 2007), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK3907/. 
 248. Some studies have attempted to measure people’s ability to recall their own 
lives in the face of questioning.  Studies have identified a dynamic called “forward 
telescoping,” where individuals project life events forward in their lives to correspond 
to a target date range being inquired into. See Loftus, supra note 220, at 134.  One 
such study involved the National Crime Survey, which entails calls to individuals to 
ask them about prior experiences of victimization that occurred within a given 
reference period. Id.  A check of prior known victimizations indicated that up to 
twenty percent of victimizations reported to having occurred within the reference 
period occurred before it. Id.  This could have implications for witnesses trying to fit 
a memory of a prior bad act into a certain time frame. 
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mistaken details.  Later as you attempt to recall the episode, you 
might come across your memory of the scrambled recall attempt 
instead of your original memory.”249  Where “you” are the witness, 
and are describing what has become a false memory due to any 
number of previously explored reasons, there is a significant amount 
of empirical evidence suggesting that your false memories will be held 
with significant confidence, even to the point of being virtually 
indistinguishable from memories of actual perceptions.250  
Furthermore, descriptions of false memories, or suggested objects, 
are likely to be very detailed.251  The prejudicial implications are 
enormous. 
Cross-examination of a witness is often the defense’s best 
opportunity to highlight weaknesses in a witness’s recollection and to 
impeach the witness’s credibility.  It is, perhaps, “the greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”252  If a witness has 
adopted a false memory and believes it to be true, however, a defense 
attorney is significantly hindered in his ability to contradict or 
impeach the witness through cross-examination, such that “[i]n the 
absence of demonstrably more reliable evidence” to the testimony 
being offered, “opposing lawyers will remain unable to discredit such 
testimony [on cross examination] because the witness sincerely 
believes the testimony is true.”253 
Trial attorneys work with witnesses regularly, and by necessity 
have every reason and opportunity to develop skill in distinguishing 
between mendacity and honesty.  Yet even the most scrutinizing 
attorney may be vulnerable to a witness who describes a false 
memory with as much confidence as a memory of an actual 
perception, yet with even more detail.  Even more problematically, at 
trial, juries have been found to respond to the amount of detail and 
confidence of witnesses.254  In one study, “detailed testimony 
influenced judgments of guilt even when the detail was unrelated to 
the culprit. . . .  When eyewitnesses provided more detail, they were 
generally judged to be more credible, to have better memory for the 
 
 249. Elizabeth Loftus, Our Changeable Memories: Legal and Practical 
Implications, 4 NATURE 231 (2003). 
 250. Id. at 232. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 301 n.151. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). 
 253. Id. at 309. 
 254. Brad Bell & Elizabeth Loftus, Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: The 
Power of (a Few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989). 
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culprit’s face and for details, and to have paid more attention to the 
culprit.”255  And these findings have been replicated, such that “many 
jury studies have indicated that the ‘confidence of the witness, rather 
than accuracy, [is] the major determinant of juror belief.”256  Given 
that witnesses have a great deal of confidence in false memories,257 
and that they report false memories with more, albeit non-sensory, 
details than they do actual memories,258 the risks of juries being 
swayed by falsehood are enormous.  Even if people are able to prefer 
genuine memories to false memories, evidence suggests that repeated 
retrieval of generated or false memories may diminish that 
preference.259 
All hope is not lost, however.  Aside from the effects of the rules of 
evidence on incentivizing witness preparation, in the decades since 
memory research first emerged, legal scholars have identified a 
number of best practices for witness preparation that could reduce 
prejudice.260  For example, beginning by asking witnesses open-ended 
questions gives them a chance to provide all of the information they 
can recall and it gives the attorney the chance to create a starting 
point against which future changes in testimony can be measured 
against to detect distortions.261  The goal of such an initial open-ended 
question is to elicit a narrative from the witness.262  Then, the attorney 
can identify the major parts of the narrative and cover each of them, 
one by one, with open-ended questions that are not as likely to create 
memory distortions.263  After the witness has thus provided a 
thorough recount of each aspect of his or her recollection, it can be 
useful to review the witness’s story with the witness, giving him or her 
an opportunity to correct any errors or fill in any missing details.264 
 
 255. Id. at 669. 
 256. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 163 (quoting Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1089 (1991)). 
 257. Loftus, supra note 249, at 232. 
 258. See id.; Schooler, supra note 235, at 174. 
 259. See Loftus, supra note 220, at 147. 
 260. See generally Applegate, supra note 175; Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi, 
supra note 176; Wydick, supra note 181. 
 261. See Wydick, supra note 181, at 48–50; Salmi, supra note 176, at 171. 
 262. See Wydick, supra note 181, at 48–50. 
 263. See id. 
 264. Id. 
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III.  ADOPTING HUDDLESTON TO REDUCE THE RISK OF 
PREJUDICE 
The policy goal underlying the exclusion of prior bad acts evidence 
is to avoid prejudice.265  Employing a preliminary fact-finding that 
requires a higher standard of proof for the commission of the acts, 
however, presents a risk of introducing false testimony through 
witness preparation.  This Note’s focus is elucidating that risk of 
prejudice, which has not been considered by courts when deciding 
whether or not to adopt Huddleston. 
In determining whether to admit prior bad acts evidence, courts 
weigh the evidence’s prejudicial risk against its probative value by 
performing a number of inquiries: whether the evidence is not overly 
prejudicial because it is being offered for a reason other than to prove 
criminal propensity; whether the prejudicial risk of the evidence 
substantially outweighs its probative value; and, to a varying degree, 
whether the prior bad acts have been proven, and thus have any 
probative value.266  Ultimately, then, admissibility is governed by a 
multi-step balancing of the evidence’s prejudicial risk and probative 
value.  Were courts to consider the risk of prejudice created by 
witness preparation and interviewing, however, their determination 
as to how best to reduce prejudice might lead to the broader adoption 
of Huddleston. 
The hypothetical prosecutor and complainant whose interaction 
began this Note illustrate this possibility.  Testimony as to the prior 
incidents of harassment and abuse is important to explain the charged 
conduct, a handful of vague phone calls to the complainant by her ex-
boyfriend, the defendant.  The calls were clearly threatening given the 
nature of the relationship between the complainant and the 
defendant, but absent that background, they leave more questions 
than answers for a jury and don’t prove much at all.  The complainant 
cannot initially recall many specifics about the defendant’s prior 
abusive behavior, however.  After eliciting that incomplete initial 
recollection during the course of interviewing and preparing the 
witness, the prosecutor will then be presented with a different 
situation depending upon whether the jurisdiction has adopted 
Huddleston.  If the jurisdiction has adopted Huddleston, then the 
prosecutor has no additional incentive, beyond an overarching one to 
have engaged in diligent preparation, to keep asking questions about 
 
 265. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 266. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
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the witness’s incomplete memory of incidents that occurred weeks 
and months in the past.  Admission is not determined by the 
prosecutor’s ability to prove the prior bad acts through detail and 
specificity, which lends it credibility, because the testimony’s 
credibility is not even considered by the trial judge.267  If the 
jurisdiction has rejected Huddleston and adopted or maintained a 
higher standard of proof where credibility is reserved for 
consideration by judges, then the prosecutor is incentivized to follow 
up with additional questions and to elicit as much specificity as the 
witness can provide in the hopes of clearing the applicable evidentiary 
standard.268 
Of course, rehearsing testimony and gathering information from a 
witness are both fundamental aspects of witness preparation.269  
Further, a witness’s difficulty in providing details for important 
evidence, prior bad acts or otherwise, would be explored in the course 
of normal preparation by a skilled attorney270—especially if the 
attorney were aware of the empirical research on the impact of detail 
on jurors.271  A clear and convincing standard of evidence for the 
commission of prior bad acts does not, in itself, create an entirely 
unique demand for preparation that is absent under jurisdictions 
adopting Huddleston.  Rather, the risk of prejudice arising from 
probing the limits of a witness’s memory about prior bad acts is 
intrinsically bound with the subtle, lingering, and inadvertent risks of 
false memories and confabulation inherent to interviewing witnesses 
generally and questioning them in all but the most precise and careful 
ways.272  Nonetheless, adopting Huddleston represents one 
opportunity to mitigate the need for preparation on prior bad acts, at 
little risk of prejudice due to the admission of prior bad acts 
evidence.273  Furthermore, evaluating Huddleston in light of the 
impact of witness preparation draws attention to the larger issue of 
 
 267. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
 269. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 270. See generally Alcorn, supra note 178. 
 271. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text. 
 272. Even then, there are the concerns that the very act of interviewing alters 
recollections. See Tanford, supra note 201, at 537. 
 273. See discussion infra Part III.A.  If a jury does not believe that the defendant 
committed the prior bad act, then they cannot logically be expected to hold it against 
the defendant.  Further, a witness’s vague or incomplete memories can be explored 
on cross-examination only if the witness has not “fill[ed] in the gaps.” Loftus, supra 
note 220, at 137. 
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how rules of evidence place an emphasis on witness preparation that 
implicitly presumes a choice courts and legislatures have made about 
the lesser of prejudicial evils.274  Additionally, doing so presents an 
opportunity to consider how future reconsiderations of different rules 
of evidence may be elucidated by discussion of the risks inherent to 
witness preparation. 
Where jurisdictions have required a higher standard of proof for 
prior bad acts evidence, they have cited concerns about prejudice.275  
Their goals, however, are ill-served by their adoption of a higher 
standard of proof.  The prejudicial impact—from the creation of false 
memories, of motivating prosecutors to ask additional questions, to 
push the boundaries of a witness’s recollection even with the most 
care and the best of intentions—outweighs the benefits of limiting 
prejudice by excluding prior bad acts evidence that the prosecutor 
cannot prove by clear and convincing, or even a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
This Part will balance the benefits of a higher standard of evidence 
with the prejudice such a standard creates.  This Part will first review 
the benefits, and then examine the potential for prejudice created by 
it.  Finally, this Part will also examine the ways that adopting 
Huddleston could reduce prejudice to the defendant. 
A. The Minimal Benefits Requiring a Higher Standard of Proof 
of Prior Bad Acts 
States that have retained a higher standard of evidence for the 
admission of prior bad acts have referred to the risk of prejudice 
inherent in prior bad acts evidence.276  The reasoning is that prior bad 
acts evidence is highly prejudicial277 and that there must be sufficient 
evidence of commission to limit the risk of the admission of evidence 
for which the defendant could be convicted, regardless of his 
culpability for the charged conduct.278  The benefit to keeping the 
evidence from the jury in the instances where it cannot be proven, 
then, protects the defendant from undue prejudice.  A second, related 
line of reasoning offered by courts is that even if the jury does not 
believe that the defendant is responsible for the conduct, the verdict 
 
 274. For a discussion of other strategies to reduce the prejudice of witness 
preparation, see supra notes 265–74 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text. 
 277. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 278. See, e.g., State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994). 
TORTORA_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 7/14/2013  10:41 PM 
2013] RECONSIDERING PRIOR BAD ACTS 1533 
may still be affected “regardless of the jury’s ultimate determination 
of the [preliminary] fact.”279  As has been noted, however, both 
arguments have been criticized, and they clearly fall apart upon closer 
examination.280 
The difference between FRE 104(a) and (b) is that the former 
pertains to preliminary facts which condition evidence’s competence 
and the latter pertains to preliminary facts which condition evidence’s 
relevance.281  It is a significant distinction.  If preliminary facts 
conditioning competence were submitted to a jury, the jury could still 
be influenced by the evidence even if it found that the evidence was 
not competent.  For example, it is not necessarily of any practical 
consequence to a juror whether a hearsay statement is technically 
admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception if it addresses a material 
fact at issue.  And there is a reasonable concern that if a jury were 
responsible for determining such a statement’s competence, it would 
be influenced by the substance of the hearsay statement regardless of 
the jury’s finding as to its admissibility.282  If a jury is given evidence 
and told to disregard it if there is insufficient proof that the evidence 
is relevant, however, there is little reason to believe that there would 
be any risk of prejudice.283  Taking the example of prior bad acts 
under Huddleston, if a jury were given evidence of the conduct, but 
did not find that the defendant committed the acts, it is hard to 
imagine how there would be a risk of prejudice because any 
reasonable juror could be expected to ignore bad acts committed by 
someone other than the defendant.  “[C]ommon sense and an 
elementary sense of fairness should prompt even a lay juror to put 
aside testimony about an act of uncharged misconduct if there is 
inadequate proof that ‘the defendant was the actor.’”284 
The arguments for reducing prejudice by conditioning prior bad 
acts evidence’s admission on a preliminary fact-finding by a judge are 
therefore marginal at best and specious at worst.  There is no risk of 
prejudice if the jury disregards irrelevant evidence, and there is no 
empirical or logical reason to believe that the jury would be 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 282. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 822–23. 
 283. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 59, § 9:64. 
 284. Id. at 834. 
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prejudiced “regardless of [its] ultimate determination” of 
commission.285 
There is a risk of prejudice to the defendant resulting from the 
admission of allegations from multiple witnesses, none of which are 
supported by much proof.286  This risk should not be overvalued, 
however.287  Any risk presented by the admission of such evidence 
under Huddleston could be addressed by scrutinizing the offered 
evidence under Rule 403, which bars cumulative or unfairly 
prejudicial evidence.288  Furthermore, under Huddleston, there would 
be no risk where there was only one prior bad act, where there 
weren’t numerous witnesses alleging prior bad acts, or where the 
alleged prior bad acts are dissimilar.289 
Finally, it is important to note that lowering the standard of 
evidence for commission of the prior bad acts does not imply 
lowering the overall standard of admissibility.  Under Huddleston, a 
court still must inquire as to whether the prior bad acts evidence is 
being offered for a proper purpose and whether the probative value 
outweighs any risk of prejudice.290  This protects the defendant from 
evidence that would be cumulative, misleading, or confusing.291  Even 
when adopting Huddleston, courts may maintain the same rigor in 
scrutinizing prior bad acts evidence for its prejudicial impact, while 
concomitantly mitigating one source of inadvertent memory 
distortions caused during witness preparation. 
B. The Risk of False Testimony Created by Requiring Greater 
Specificity by Witnesses 
By rejecting Huddleston, courts run up against the risks of 
prejudice inherent in witness preparation: the creation of false 
testimony and the diminishment of effective cross-examination.  
When there is a minimum bar for admissibility of which an attorney is 
aware, there is a fundamental need to determine whether the 
 
 285. State v. McGinnis, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 (W. Va. 1994). 
 286. See supra notes 163–65. 
 287. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 840–44. 
 288. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”) 
 289. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 840–43. 
 290. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 682 (1988). 
 291. See United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 277 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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complainant or witness is capable of providing testimony that can 
clear that preliminary bar.  Focusing on the issue of recollection 
during witness preparation activates many sources of memory 
distortion.292  For example, the attorney’s unconscious desire for the 
witness to recall the prior bad acts in greater detail can lead to the 
witness detecting the attorney’s goal and “fill[ing] in gaps” in the their 
memory.293  This poses an obvious risk of prejudice when witnesses 
testify falsely.  It also poses a risk of prejudice, however, insofar as 
defendants are limited in their ability to draw out the distortions in 
the witness’s memory and to sufficiently impeach the witness’s 
credibility. 
Cross-examination has long been viewed as the mechanism for 
addressing witness bias294 and for “ferreting out truth.”295  Yet it is an 
imperfect tool, the efficacy of which must be questioned in light of 
science’s growing knowledge of memory.296  For example, people are 
susceptible to “memory hardening,” whereby once-unclear memories 
can become solidified in their recollections through repeated 
retrieval.297  In addition, witnesses tend to become as confident in 
false memories as they are in memories based on actual perception, 
and will provide more details of the former than the latter.298 
C. Witness Preparation and the Rules of Evidence: Is Adopting 
Huddleston the Best Solution to a Difficult Problem? 
Witness preparation remains a fundamental and universal aspect of 
American litigation.299  Any prejudice resulting from the creation of 
false memories certainly needs to be taken in the larger context of the 
benefits witness preparation provides in purging inadmissible 
statements from testimony, and in making witnesses comfortable and 
able to testify completely, among other benefits.300  Although those 
benefits have long been recognized, the rules of evidence and its use 
of witness preparation as a first step in mitigating testimonial 
 
 292. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 293. See supra note 271–72 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text. 
 295. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989) (quoting United States v. DiLapi, 651 
F.2d 140, 149–51 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mischler, J., concurring)). 
 296. See Applegate, supra note 175, at 309–15. 
 297. See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 
483 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1987); Wydick, supra note 181, at 11. 
 298. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 299. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 300. Id. 
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prejudice were developed in the decades before research on memory 
burgeoned and created an awareness of the risks of preparation.301 
The Model Rules do not provide significant guidance on witness 
interviewing or preparation.  For many civil or criminal defense 
attorneys, a duty of zealous representation marginalizes the benefits 
of scrutinizing their own clients or witnesses for any potential false 
memories because it may undermine the attorney-client relationship.  
However, for prosecutors, who are responsible for seeking truth, 
whose witnesses bear an additional credibility through mere 
association with the Government, and whose trials result in the 
forfeiture of a defendant’s freedom, purging witness interviewing and 
preparation of sources of false memories is a pressing concern.  State 
legal systems may attempt to reduce the introduction of false 
memories by implementing several complementary reforms.302   
Adopting Huddleston would reduce the pressure on prosecutors 
and witnesses to provide details that are simply not within the powers 
of recollection for the witness.  In addition, providers of continuing 
legal education should create and encourage attendance at lessons 
that review best practices for witness preparation based on current 
understandings of memory.303  Similar lessons could also be integrated 
into law school curricula.  Finally, best practices could be codified in 
the Model Rules as the proper method of interviewing and preparing 
witnesses. 
Another solution may be for prosecutors to take careful note of 
any changes in a witness’s testimony.304  If testimony changes as a 
result of the interview in potentially substantive ways, a lawyer should 
“prep it back to the way it was.”305  Recording the witness’s initial 
account can aid in this process.306  Such a requirement, however, 
would be deeply complicated by requirements that such records be 
turned over to a defendant in criminal proceedings.307  Prosecutors are 
 
 301. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, based on debates and 
practices that predated them by decades. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85.  Research 
on memory began developing primarily in the 1970s. See generally Loftus, supra note 
220. 
 302. See generally Applegate, supra note 175; Gershman, supra note 2; Salmi, 
supra note 176; Wydick, supra note 181. 
 303. For a review of some best practices, see supra notes 260–64 and accompanying 
text. 
 304. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 173. 
 305. Tanford, supra note 201, at 541. 
 306. See Salmi, supra note 176, at 173. 
 307. See supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text. 
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acutely disincentivized from recording witness’s statements for that 
very reason308—the concern being that defense counsel could gain 
materials with which to impeach the prosecution’s witness.309 
CONCLUSION 
Witness interviewing and preparation, though necessary and 
beneficial, pose many risks of creating false testimony.  Psychological 
and legal research continue to elucidate these risks.  Current 
understandings of memory make it clear, however, that entirely 
ethical and scrupulous practices can nonetheless result in the 
distortion of a witness’s recollections.  As a result, the jurisdictions 
that have rejected the Court’s holding in Huddleston out of a fear of 
prejudicing the defendant should instead adopt it.  Adopting 
Huddleston will remove an additional incentive for prosecutors to 
prepare witnesses with a focus on eliciting detail that a witness may 
be incapable of recalling.  Such a reform would not singularly 
eliminate the prejudicial risks of even careful witness preparation.  
Nonetheless, if courts were to consider the risks inherent in witness 
preparation, the balance of risks would favor adopting Huddleston. 
 
 308. See Gershmann, supra note 2, at 851–53. 
 309. Id. 
